In the comments of the post called, "Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology": What's the Difference?, r.j.marvin and I have been having an interesting conversation on communication. A concern was expressed: when individuals engage in dialogue, can they rationally discuss topics where the definitions of major points of contention are unclear? For example, assume that an atheist, a Calvinist, and a Muslim were engaged in a dialogue about God. The atheist remarks that the idea of God is internally contradictory, due to the nature of omnipotence and omni-benevolence. The Calvinist remarks that God has mysteries that cannot be explained, such as the nature of the trinity, but is not internally contradictory. The Muslim remarks that the idea of God is not internally contradictory and, while mysterious, has no apparent contradictions. It seems like all three of these discussants have different definitions of God. Can they, thus, rationally discuss the topic?
First, I will argue why they can. Second, I will defend against reasons why they allegedly could not by addressing the initial quandary.
If it were true that individuals can maintain distinct definitions of words without the possibility of harmonization, definitions would be meaningless and devoid of substance, because they would not have any references. Imagine if I defined "Quarorglewoggle" as "Gltheltic-giborglewoggle". If you asked me to define "Gltheltic-jiborglejiggle", I would continue using nonsense words with no real-world references, and would eventually come back to "Quarorglewoggle". We would thus not be able to have any legitimate knowledge of what is being communicated. In other words, if the skeptical concern is legitimate, we would not have legitimate understanding of the references of others' words. Since we do have legitimate understanding of the references of others' words (given that you are reading this), it is not the case that the skeptical concern is true (and, thus, the skeptical concern is false), at least about some words.
"Some words", however, is very different from "all words" (there's a puzzle for you). Could there exist a word that, through the method I outlined above, can be circularly defined in nonsensical terms? Yes-- consider "quarorglewoggle". Here's my question: we have the word "quarorglewoggle". Is there actually a reference of the word? In other words, we can imagine "quarorglewoggle" (the word); can the speaker imagine quarorglewoggle (the reference of the word)? If not, they are either deceiving their fellow discussant (but we're assuming that they're acting in good faith, so this isn't an issue), or there is actually something that the word refers to. There exist many properties that, as we have already established, are not nonsensical (in that they can be meaningfully defined). Each of these properties either do or do not relate to the definition of the word. For example, if I defined the "best flavor of icecream" as "that particular taste of ice cream that is most pleasing to the taster", the property of being "Cherry-Vanilla" does not relate to the definition of the word-- merely the instantiation (the carrying-out) of the definition.
Back to our initial quandary. If a Calvinist claims that the definition of God, via the Trinity, is mysterious but not contradictory, we should tell him/her that they are mistaken. The Trinity is no more a part of the definition of God than Cherry-Vanilla is part of the definition of the best flavor of ice-cream; it's part of the instantiation. The Muslim's claim is coherent. The Atheist's claim, that the definition of God entails a contradiction (omni-benevolence and omnipotence) sets us up for a great topic that could be discussed, but makes the same mistake as a Calvinist. The Greek gods were certainly not omnibenevolent, nor were they omnipotent, and yet they are still referred to as gods. The Atheist concern is with a specific instantiation of the definition of God, not with the definition of God itself.
In conclusion, we must be careful when we distinguish between definitions and instantiations of definitions. There are no true contradictions in reality (assertion on my part, feel free to challenge it), and thus no definition will be contradictory. Instantiations of definitions, however, may be. The definition of "contradiction" is not contradictory, but all instantiations of "contradictions" are, necessarily, contradictory.
Make sense? Share your thoughts, comments, and arguments below. I look forward to your feedback!
Wednesday, November 17, 2010
On Communication and Definitions
Posted by Zach Sherwin at 9:20 AM
Labels: communication, definitions, epistemology, God, good faith, language, speech
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7 comments:
Here are my initial questions:
1. What is the status of the philosopher’s ability to access non-contradictory instantiations of certain definitions?
2. Could this be an argument against a priori propositions? How does one know that 2+2 must equal 4? A skeptical concern is that human beings may be wired to hold the instantiations of definitions in ways that are species serving. In other words, are we anthropomorphizing reality? If so, can we escape this problem?
3. Because definitions are non-contradictory, can they be explained logically? Can the logical components of a definition’s explanation be explained further?
Ray,
Thanks for the questions. I'll do my best to respond.
1. I'm unclear what you're asking. When you specify "certain definitions", it sounds like you're hinting at something that may break my theory, but I'm uncertain of what it is. At any rate, it does seem like philosophers have no logical obstruction (although there could obviously be non-logical obstructions, such as death, loss of hearing, or poor language skills) to accessing most definitions.
2. Several things build in here. I don't believe this negates the legitimacy of a priori truths. We still know that 2+2=4, because if we state that it is not the case that (2+2=4), or that 2+2 does not equal 4, we get a contradiction. This does not alter the definition of the terms.
Humans may be wired to not be maximally rational (as you seem to imply in your second part of this second point), but that's a practical concern, not a logical one. Unless you hold a strictly deterministic account of human nature, I don't think you need assume that our default modes of being necessarily restrict our possible future modes of being to only mimic what has been in the past.
3. We may be acting under different definitions of "logically". If, by logically, you mean that all definitions can be expressed in symbolic forms that are not internally contradictory (even if we don't know how to do so), then yes, I think that your statement is correct. That being said, this is an ontological claim, not an epistemological claim. I don't know how to define ribonucleic acid (although I could describe it and give some of its properties), but I don't think there is any reason why the definition could not be expressed in logical terms.
Thoughts?
1. I agree with you about logical obstructions,but let me add to your list of non logical abstractions: along with death, loss of hearing, and poor language skills there are cultural stigma, past experiences, poor eyesight, poor social skills, psycological disorders, wealth, education, class, nationality, goverment, and luck. It seems that all of these get in the way of us, and truth.
2. Maybe 2+2=4 is a poor example. What about 2=2. How do we absolutly know this has to be?
2a. I do hold a somewhat deterministic view on human nature in that, unless there is a highly successfull genetic mutation that affects our cognitive abilities, or that the human condition changes drastically enough (see non-logical obstruction list in point 1) human philosophers are somewhat stuck.
3.I have a hunch that there may be a relationship between a things ontology and its epistemology in that the 'idea' of a thing may have a similair ontological makeup as its physical form. So one can deconstruct the composition of the idea of a coffee table in the same way one can deconstruct the physical substance of the coffee table. So if a philosopher worked hard enough, his epistemological claims about the coffee table may affected by its ontology.
Thoughts? Am I going too far with my non-logical obstruction list? Is my deterministic view of human nature unecessary? Is my ontological/epistemological relationship unfounded?
Ray,
Thanks as always for your thoughts and insight.
1. You're certainly correct that all sorts of non-logical, pragmatic barriers can obstruct access to definitional truths. However, it's unclear to what degree they play a role. It would be interested to read a study or hear an argument about the size of the problem.
2. 2=2 should not be any more difficult. In all honesty, that's a rather elementary difficult, because if 2 does not equal 2, we allow for true contradictions.
2a. What do you mean by, "somewhat stuck"? Can you elucidate?
3. If the "idea" of a thing tends to have a similar ontological makeup to its physical form, it would seem that my idea of a coffee table is, in fact, similar to a coffee table. However, that doesn't seem right-- my idea itself does not resemble a coffee table. Furthermore, imagine a series of nonexistent things (the Loch Ness Monster, phlogiston, telekinesis). Is your idea of those things nonexistent? The main property actually held by nonexistent things is the property of nonexistence, but your idea of them is not nonexistent. Is this a problem, or can your account accommodate that?
I don't want to say that you went to far, but I'd like to hear more of your argument. Thanks for your great responses and thoughts-- I'm enjoying our dialogue!
1. in response to point 2a, I was inspired to write that we are somewhat stuck by hannah arndt and her philosophy. I know it sounds like Lawler's post modern conservativism but I wanted to stress the role of the human condition rather than human nature. I feel that the conditions in which we live dictate the problems we have, whether it be social, govermental, practical, or philosophical. So while philosophers seek to unravel the obvious conditions with education and abstract thought, they will always be burdened with a host of conditions that are unexcapable. Sociologists study this. Arndt's book The Human Condition discusses this problem.
2. In response to point 3, my contention is that your idea of a coffee table, when thought of, is composed in the same fashion as the physical coffee table. Upon introspection, certain elements of the coffee table can be deducted. An engineer or chemist may do the same with the physical coffee table. Regardless the end result is that the subject in concern is composed of causes. For the scientist, the coffee table is composed of external causes that are material which can be known emperically. For the modern philosopher, the coffee table is inferred by the maxims of flat, four legs, and able to hold coffee which held together cause the idea of the coffee table
2a. In response to the second half of point 3, you maintain that a dominant property of the lochness is its nonexistance. This is confusing to me. The idea of the lochness certainly exists in my head like you wrote. The concept of nonexistance seems to only apply to the physical lochness, not to my idea of it so I'm not sure if it is a main property. Even still, the concept of nothingness lacks substance. I do not know what it means to experience nothingness, and any definition of the word 'nonexistance' seems to rely on inferred maxims such as 'not taking up space' that are equally unsubstantial. Even if one assented that nonexistance is empty space, what is a singulare empty space but a composite of empty spaces held tightly together? Regardless it doesn't seem that maintaining 'a thing itself' as the cause of your idea of the coffee table or lochness as logically necessary. If anything it comlicates things.
By the way jello is amazing and my comment above is inspired my Russell's commentary on 'ant in his book A History of Western Philosophy. Also, sorry for the mispellings I wrote this entire comment on my blackberry.
1. in response to point 2a, I was inspired to write that we are somewhat stuck by hannah arndt and her philosophy. I know it sounds like Lawler's post modern conservativism but I wanted to stress the role of the human condition rather than human nature. I feel that the conditions in which we live dictate the problems we have, whether it be social, govermental, practical, or philosophical. So while philosophers seek to unravel the obvious conditions with education and abstract thought, they will always be burdened with a host of conditions that are unexcapable. Sociologists study this. Arndt's book The Human Condition discusses this problem.
2. In response to point 3, my contention is that your idea of a coffee table, when thought of, is composed in the same fashion as the physical coffee table. Upon introspection, certain elements of the coffee table can be deducted. An engineer or chemist may do the same with the physical coffee table. Regardless the end result is that the subject in concern is composed of causes. For the scientist, the coffee table is composed of external causes that are material which can be known emperically. For the modern philosopher, the coffee table is inferred by the maxims of flat, four legs, and able to hold coffee which held together cause the idea of the coffee table
2a. In response to the second half of point 3, you maintain that a dominant property of the lochness is its nonexistance. This is confusing to me. The idea of the lochness certainly exists in my head like you wrote. The concept of nonexistance seems to only apply to the physical lochness, not to my idea of it so I'm not sure if it is a main property. Even still, the concept of nothingness lacks substance. I do not know what it means to experience nothingness, and any definition of the word 'nonexistance' seems to rely on inferred maxims such as 'not taking up space' that are equally unsubstantial. Even if one assented that nonexistance is empty space, what is a singulare empty space but a composite of empty spaces held tightly together? Regardless it doesn't seem that maintaining 'a thing itself' as the cause of your idea of the coffee table or lochness as logically necessary. If anything it comlicates things.
By the way jello is amazing and my comment above is inspired my Russell's commentary on 'ant in his book A History of Western Philosophy. Also, sorry for the mispellings I wrote this entire comment on my blackberry.
1. in response to point 2a, I was inspired to write that we are somewhat stuck by hannah arndt and her philosophy. I know it sounds like Lawler's post modern conservativism but I wanted to stress the role of the human condition rather than human nature. I feel that the conditions in which we live dictate the problems we have, whether it be social, govermental, practical, or philosophical. So while philosophers seek to unravel the obvious conditions with education and abstract thought, they will always be burdened with a host of conditions that are unexcapable. Sociologists study this. Arndt's book The Human Condition discusses this problem.
2. In response to point 3, my contention is that your idea of a coffee table, when thought of, is composed in the same fashion as the physical coffee table. Upon introspection, certain elements of the coffee table can be deducted. An engineer or chemist may do the same with the physical coffee table. Regardless the end result is that the subject in concern is composed of causes. For the scientist, the coffee table is composed of external causes that are material which can be known emperically. For the modern philosopher, the coffee table is inferred by the maxims of flat, four legs, and able to hold coffee which held together cause the idea of the coffee table
2a. In response to the second half of point 3, you maintain that a dominant property of the lochness is its nonexistance. This is confusing to me. The idea of the lochness certainly exists in my head like you wrote. The concept of nonexistance seems to only apply to the physical lochness, not to my idea of it so I'm not sure if it is a main property. Even still, the concept of nothingness lacks substance. I do not know what it means to experience nothingness, and any definition of the word 'nonexistance' seems to rely on inferred maxims such as 'not taking up space' that are equally unsubstantial. Even if one assented that nonexistance is empty space, what is a singulare empty space but a composite of empty spaces held tightly together? Regardless it doesn't seem that maintaining 'a thing itself' as the cause of your idea of the coffee table or lochness as logically necessary. If anything it comlicates things.
By the way jello is amazing and my comment above is inspired my Russell's commentary on 'ant in his book A History of Western Philosophy. Also, sorry for the mispellings I wrote this entire comment on my blackberry.
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