On Communication and Definitions

In the comments of the post called, "Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology": What's the Difference?, r.j.marvin and I have been having an interesting conversation on communication. A concern was expressed: when individuals engage in dialogue, can they rationally discuss topics where the definitions of major points of contention are unclear? For example, assume that an atheist, a Calvinist, and a Muslim were engaged in a dialogue about God. The atheist remarks that the idea of God is internally contradictory, due to the nature of omnipotence and omni-benevolence. The Calvinist remarks that God has mysteries that cannot be explained, such as the nature of the trinity, but is not internally contradictory. The Muslim remarks that the idea of God is not internally contradictory and, while mysterious, has no apparent contradictions. It seems like all three of these discussants have different definitions of God. Can they, thus, rationally discuss the topic?

First, I will argue why they can. Second, I will defend against reasons why they allegedly could not by addressing the initial quandary.

If it were true that individuals can maintain distinct definitions of words without the possibility of harmonization, definitions would be meaningless and devoid of substance, because they would not have any references. Imagine if I defined "Quarorglewoggle" as "Gltheltic-giborglewoggle". If you asked me to define "Gltheltic-jiborglejiggle", I would continue using nonsense words with no real-world references, and would eventually come back to "Quarorglewoggle". We would thus not be able to have any legitimate knowledge of what is being communicated. In other words, if the skeptical concern is legitimate, we would not have legitimate understanding of the references of others' words. Since we do have legitimate understanding of the references of others' words (given that you are reading this), it is not the case that the skeptical concern is true (and, thus, the skeptical concern is false), at least about some words.

"Some words", however, is very different from "all words" (there's a puzzle for you). Could there exist a word that, through the method I outlined above, can be circularly defined in nonsensical terms? Yes-- consider "quarorglewoggle". Here's my question: we have the word "quarorglewoggle". Is there actually a reference of the word? In other words, we can imagine "quarorglewoggle" (the word); can the speaker imagine quarorglewoggle (the reference of the word)? If not, they are either deceiving their fellow discussant (but we're assuming that they're acting in good faith, so this isn't an issue), or there is actually something that the word refers to. There exist many properties that, as we have already established, are not nonsensical (in that they can be meaningfully defined). Each of these properties either do or do not relate to the definition of the word. For example, if I defined the "best flavor of icecream" as "that particular taste of ice cream that is most pleasing to the taster", the property of being "Cherry-Vanilla" does not relate to the definition of the word-- merely the instantiation (the carrying-out) of the definition.

Back to our initial quandary. If a Calvinist claims that the definition of God, via the Trinity, is mysterious but not contradictory, we should tell him/her that they are mistaken. The Trinity is no more a part of the definition of God than Cherry-Vanilla is part of the definition of the best flavor of ice-cream; it's part of the instantiation. The Muslim's claim is coherent. The Atheist's claim, that the definition of God entails a contradiction (omni-benevolence and omnipotence) sets us up for a great topic that could be discussed, but makes the same mistake as a Calvinist. The Greek gods were certainly not omnibenevolent, nor were they omnipotent, and yet they are still referred to as gods. The Atheist concern is with a specific instantiation of the definition of God, not with the definition of God itself.

In conclusion, we must be careful when we distinguish between definitions and instantiations of definitions. There are no true contradictions in reality (assertion on my part, feel free to challenge it), and thus no definition will be contradictory. Instantiations of definitions, however, may be. The definition of "contradiction" is not contradictory, but all instantiations of "contradictions" are, necessarily, contradictory.

Make sense? Share your thoughts, comments, and arguments below. I look forward to your feedback!

Freedom is Not Free

Thus far this semester, we have written a couple posts that have made a few cracks in the surface of the free will/ fatalism debate. The first post was Zach Sherwin’s Ontological Argument Against Fatalism, and then a few weeks ago I presented Chrysippus’ views on Free Will and Responsibility. While we’ve by no stretch been exhaustive here of course, perhaps we’ve piqued your interest a bit with what we have covered. If so, I’d like to continue the discussion here with something that’s been rattling around in my brain for a while, so let’s ensue on a separate and all-new branch with an aspect of the quandary that’s yet to be mentioned.

Throughout the rest of the post, I’ll refer to God – for the sake of argument and of brevity for this blog, assume I mean the traditional Judeo-Christian God. Here’s the question: Is human free will incompatible with God? If humans have complete free will, meaning that they have real freedom in choice and action all the time, then God would necessarily not interfere with human will. But does it follow that God then can’t influence free will? Even if we say, he could but he chooses not to, does his ability there, even as just an option, mean freedom is somehow diminished? In the ultimate and complete free will scenario, would God’s mere ability to alter, influence, or affect our decisions mean that, really, we’re only as free as long as he allows, that freedom is more dependent, then shadowy and illusory, than we think it is? Humans then have freedom when God chooses not to exercise his ability, meaning that he could, at his choosing, decide to step in and affect human free will as soon as he wants to. He is all-powerful, so of course God has every ability to affect (and remove) free will; even if he has decided not to do so, especially in respect to human choice in salvation, he, in theory, could, right?

This poses problems for some – they would say that we then cannot have free will at all. Consider their argument: At that moment when we say God can affect human free will, it no longer exists. More deductively: If there exists the possibility that humans have free will – that what and how humans choose or decide is not able to be influenced, altered, or changed by God – then God can’t affect human free will. But God is all-powerful, so he can affect free will. Therefore, free will is incompatible with God and his omnipotence.

But is this necessarily true? Isn’t it sufficient that he doesn’t routinely affect free will, even though he can? I would argue that their claim assumes too much. Free will isn’t necessarily defined as only holding true if God can’t affect free will. He may have chosen not to, to preserve free will and free choice, to let human beings choose what they will, including sin and salvation. But God is still omnipotent; he could interfere and may and may have, or he may not. In any case, the mere fact that he can affect free will doesn’t mean it necessarily cannot exist. Here I’m not arguing for or against free will per say, or addressing free choice in terms of salvation in the Calvinism v. Arminianism predestination realm (though this does bear worthy and interesting implications in apologetics), but I’ve attempted to prove that at least the one claim above that’s put forward by some is too weak to be accepted, being flawed by definition, and that it does not conclusively or deductively prove free will’s incompatibility with God’s sovereignty.

So there you have part three of this semester’s posts on fatalism and free will. Whether this is all really for naught, you may be the judge (if you can). Perhaps this is truly a “timeless” dilemma, one flawed from before its beginning. But give us your thoughts, if you so choose.