"Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology": What's the Difference?

Greetings,

Your experience might differ, but I find that those with a passion for philosophy (including the philosophy of religion) tend not to share a passion for theology, and vice versa. This has sparked a question in my mind: what is the difference between "philosophy of religion" and "theology"? In this post, propose a theory that hopefully gives us a satisfactory answer. I propose that, in order to understand the difference between "philosophy of religion" and "theology", you ought to accept the following:

1. "Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology" both refer to logically consistent inquiries, which usually take the form of arguments.

2. The subject of the inquiries of both "Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology" is the same: divinity. This is, presumably, a subset of the supernatural.

3. As the subject of both inquiries is the same, the differentiating factor must lie in the form of the inquiry itself.

4. Inquiries can only prove the veracity of their conclusions if the negation of the conclusion yields a contradiction.

5. The only truths philosophy has available are those which are tautologically true-- that is, true by nature of their logical form. The proposition, (a) or [not (a)], is true by nature of its form. Yes, this seems to entail classical logic, although the truth is that it need not. Roll with me, here.

6. Theology has all philosophical truths available to it (that is, theology does not embrace contradictory claims).

7. The truthfulness of premises in a philosophical argument can only be evaluated in terms of their internal/external logical consistency.

8. Here's where the difference lies: Theological claims can also form inquiries where the truthfulness of a premise is not determined simply by logical consistency.

By now, you're saying... "Zach, this is too much. Break it down for me". To quote Dale Cooper... "Okay."

1. All arguments that are sound in the philosophy of religion are sound in theology.
2. Not all arguments that are sound in theology are sound in the philosophy of religion.

Example of a Philosophical Argument
1. Either God exists or he does not.
2. If God exists in possibility, he exists in necessity.
3. It's possible that God exists.
4. Thus, God exists necessarily.

This argument may not be sound, but it can be understood and evaluated in philosophical terms. An individual might critique the second or third premise, but his critique would be grounded in logic.

Example of a Theological Argument
1. Either humans are predestined or they are to be held responsible.
2. God holds humans responsible.
3. God does what he ought to do.
4. Thus, humans are not predestined.

Philosophically, this is not an interesting argument. Premises 2 and 3 are determined to be true or false depending on adherence to religious principles, not logical necessity. However, this argument can be converted into a philosophical argument...

Example of a Philosophical Argument
1, Either humans are predestined or they are to be held responsible
2. Thus, if [God exists] and [God holds humans responsible] and [God does what he ought to do], then humans are not predestined.

This is actually philosophically interesting-- it doesn't presuppose the existence of God, but is concerned with logical entailment if he does exist (and other premises follow).

In conclusion, all truths determined through the philosophy of religion are true according to theological inquiry as well, as theology has all the tools of philosophy of religion available. However, not all truths revealed by theological inquiries are true in accordance with the philosophy of religion. It may be possible to convert these to philosophical claims, but the inquiry loses some of its impact.

Thoughts/comments/suggestions/criticisms will be much appreciated!

Zach's Ontology of Truth

Greetings once again, everyone,

Last night's meeting on the philosophical implications of the governmental censorship of obscenity was evocative, edgy, and yet hopefully still both fun and educational.

After the meeting, a few of us hung out and discussed something I had been pondering for some time, but had not actually written out until earlier that day: my proposed ontology of truth. For those who don't know, "ontology" refers to the science or study of the nature of existence. This is not an ontological argument for truth; rather, it is an attempt at classifying what I believe are actual kinds of truths.




Let the predicate "P" refer to "...Coheres with...", so that "Pxy" refers to "x coheres with y".
Let the predicate "S" refer to "...Is a statement", so that "Sx" refers to "x is a statement".
For "Objective Truths", let "T" refer to the one-place predicate, "...Is true", so that "Tx" refers to "x is true".
For "Subjective Truths", let "T" refer to the two-place predicate, "...Is true for...", so that "Txy" refers to "x is true for y".
In these propositions, "x" refers to statements that individuals make, and this test seeks to show whether a statement "x" is.
In these propositions, "y" can be interpreted different ways, depending on your approach to various epistemological issues. I personally find it easiest to think of "y" as a paradigm, as Kuhn considered it. If you have issues with Kuhn's summation of paradigms, think of "y" as a worldview or a summation of perceptions of sorts.
In these propositions, "z" refers to a a subject. "Txz" would thus mean that "x is true for z".

That should hopefully do it. If anyone has a hard time reading the image or interpreting the notation, let me know, and I'm happy to help.

At any rate, here's the gist. Note that the examples I provide are not meant to be insightful and provocative insomuch as they are meant to be noncontroversial. The difficult questions can come later.
For x to be an Objectively Absolute truth, it must correspond to all y paradigms that correspond with reality. If there exists a y paradigm that corresponds with reality, but x does not correspond with this y paradigm, x is not an Objectively Absolute truth. Most (if not all) mathematical axioms, such as that the successor of zero does not equal zero, would fall under this category.

For x to be an Objectively Relative truth, it must correspond to at least one y paradigm that corresponds with reality. If there exists a y paradigm that corresponds with reality, but x does not correspond with this y paradigm, this is not a problem, because this truth is relative. There are possible worlds, perhaps, where paradigm y does not correspond with reality; nevertheless, y corresponds to some reality, so x is true, at least in an Objectively Relative sense. As an example of an Objectively Relative truth, consider the statement, "the universe is constantly expanding".

For x to be a Subjectively Absolute truth, it must correspond to all y paradigms that correspond to reality, and there must exist a subject such that x is true for that subject. These truths require a subject in order for them to be true. For example, consider, "I ought not do that which is wrong". Such a statement requires the existence of a subject, an "I", in order for it to be possibly true. If there does not exist a z such that, for z, this x statement is true for z, x is not true at all.

For x to be a Subjectively Relative truth, it must correspond to at least one y paradigm that corresponds with reality and there must exist a subject such that x is true for that subject. As an example of a Subjectively Relative truth, consider, "Ice cream is my favorite cold desert". This statement corresponds with a y paradigm-- my current one-- that also corresponds with reality. However, at a future point, that y might no longer correspond with reality; I might pick a different cold desert as my favorite. Thus, truths under this category are Subjectively Relative, as opposed to Subjectively Absolute.

Thoughts/comments/suggestions? Criticisms? Applause? Disgust? Hunger for ice cream? Thanks for your comments!