Challenges for Locke's Idea of Property Rights

Greetings,

In John Locke's Second Treatise, he argues for a certain conception of property rights and ethical ownership. You can read a relevant chapter of his work by clicking here. While there are several strong reasons to accept what Locke proposes, those who would do so ought to be able to deal with a few issues that may generate tension. That's not to say that these issues are insurmountable, per se, but rather than a coherent Lockean ought to be able to respond to them. I will try to mention a few possible issues below. Feel free to argue for your position or simply list your thoughts in the comments.

1. Assume that a corporation, Acme Co., has an employee, Moriarty, who is hired to cut down a tree that would potentially be in the way of the anvil plant that they are planning to construct. This land has never been claimed, and no one contests Moriarty's-- or, by extension, Acme's-- presence. Moriarty cuts down the wood. Per Locke, who owns the wood? Is Locke right?

2. Assume that Acme has entered into the music business. They hire a musician, Moriarty II, to produce music for them. A college student, Jack Sherman, downloads this music without the consent of Acme-- although, with the consent of Moriarty II. Per Locke, did Jack steal Acme's intellectual property? Did he steal Moriarty II's intellectual property? Is there such thing as intellectual property? Is Locke right?

3. Assume that Acme has generated a computer that strings together every possible combination of musical notes and lyrics-- and also strings together every possible combination of sequences of musical notes and lyrics, up to 45 minutes in length. It has an entire continent filled with speakers, stacked high to the sky, and each speaker plays a combination. Per Locke, does Acme thus own every song up to 45 minutes in length that had not been created before the computer did its work?

4. Assume that Acme has created biological life-- and it looks like a human, has the genetic composition of a human, and seems to age like a human. It was not contested that Acme owned the base materials it generated the biological lifeform, which it calls Moriarty IV, from. Per Locke, does it own that human? Is Locke right?

5. Assume that, while on the job, an employee, Moriarty V, dies. Acme immediately uses his body for lunchroom cafeteria meat. His relatives protest. Per Locke, did Acme have the right to Moriarty's body? Is Locke right?

Chrysippus on Free Will and Responsibility

While reading this morning, I came across a passage in my book that I think relates well to our discussion on fatalism earlier this semester and also to the topic for tomorrow night: free will and addiction, and the ethical responsibilities for self-harming actions. The author starts by detailing the beliefs of the Stoics concerning the free will, or for them, the lack of it, possessed by human beings – except for the sage, but that’s a different topic. As the author puts it, for the Stoics, events of nature and human events are “parts of the universal casual nexus which is fate, providence or God, and so…predetermined.” Their critics attacked this viewpoint by claiming that if everything were predetermined, there would be no responsibility or good deeds able to be praised or bad deeds to be condemned, just as we were conjecturing about the existence of morality in a fatalistic world in one of our prior club meetings. Yet Chrysippus, one of the most eminent of the Stoics, argued for the compatibility of fatalism and responsibility in 2 ways. First, even if our actions are really predetermined reactions to external influences or impressions, they are still our own reactions. Chrysippus writes:

“Although it is the case that all things are constrained and bound together by fate through a certain necessary and primary principle, yet the way in which the natures of our minds themselves are subject to fate depends on their own individual quality. For if they have been fashioned through nature originally in a healthy and expedient way, they pass on all that force, which assails them from outside through fate, in a more placid and pliant manner. If, however, they are harsh and ignorant and uncultured, and if they are pressed on by little or no necessity from an impulse they hurl themselves into constant crimes and error. And that this very thing should come about in this way is a result of that natural and necessary sequence which is called fate. For it is, as it were, fated and a consequence of their type itself, that bad natures should not lack crimes and errors. It is just as if you throw a cylindrical stone across a region of ground which is sloping and steep; you were the cause and beginning of headlong fall for it, but soon it rolls headlong, not because you are now bringing that about, but because that is how its fashion and the capacity for rolling in its shape are. Just so the rule and principle and necessity of fate sets kinds and beginnings of causes in motion, but the impulses of our minds and deliberations, and our actions themselves, are governed by each person’s own will and by the natures of our minds.” (Gellius, Attic Nights 7.2.7-11 = LS 62D)

So, we may wonder, if it is our developed natures, which have been predetermined before our birth, (that is the reason for our throwing the stone from the hill) which cause our reaction to outside influences, and the reaction is ours (we do the throwing) – can it still be our responsibility for the event or its outcome? If we blame what we have been predisposed to, our natures that have been given to us, but it is still we who (must) react in a certain way, how much responsibility is ours? For Monday’s talk, is an addiction, presumably something of nature, our responsibility or only reactions to external forces?

The second part of Chrysippus’ argument for responsibility and fatalism is that our actions (or reactions) do make a difference, even though predetermined. The author explains: “To say that certain things are fated to happen does not mean that they are fated to happen regardless of what anyone does beforehand, but rather that certain outcomes and the actions which are necessary to bring them about are ‘co-fated’ with one another.”

This seems quite the paradox, then. It may be clarified as the author shows if we think about an example from the Greek tragedy Oedipus. It would be complete nonsense to say that Oedipus’ father would have had a child whether he slept with a woman or not. Yet he chose to take that risk even after being warned by the oracle that his son would kill him. He wouldn’t have chosen otherwise, but it was still his choice; it is his responsibility, even if the action (or reaction) was predetermined.

What do we think of this argument? Coherent and conclusive? Confusing and lacking?

An Attempt at Defining "Art"

Greetings,

On Monday, Philosophia Religioque met and discussed the philosophy of music. One relevant topic that came up was the definition of "art", and what demarcates it from other content. While I am not yet 100% convinced that my definition is necessarily right, I proposed that "art", properly understood, is intentional indirect communication. I'll start by explaining what is meant by those terms, and then get into some of the issues that can be derived from this definition.

At its core level, art is a kind of communication; in fact, I would consider art to fall under the genus of communication. Merriam Webster states that communication is "an act or instance of transmitting". If a painting could only communicate through its visual imagery, and there existed an invisible painting (which I do believe can be understood in concept, even if it's unlikely that one will ever exist), that painting would not be art, because it would be incapable of communication. However, I believe that many things in life qualify as "communications"; thus, this is a broad element, on which I will not say too much more at the moment.

If art is a kind of communication, what kind it? Well, I argue that art is necessarily intentional communication. What is intentional is the communication itself. Say, for example, that I look at the computer monitor in front of me and note its subtly sloping angles, well-rounded curves, and bi-colored palette. While it is true that the monitor might communicate to me a poignant message about the nature of the human condition/experience, such a communication would not have been the intention of the monitor manufacturer, and thus that communication would have been insufficient for the monitor to be considered "art" (although I am not necessarily excluding the possibility of other communications, of course). Even bad art-- whether angsty teenage poetry or annoying pop songs-- serves as intentional communication.

However, while a communication must be intentional to be art, intention is insufficient. For example, if I tell you in a monotone voice, "go outside", that is an intentional communication, and yet is not art (I would argue, and would believe to be non-controversial). This is because that which is communicated through art is necessarily indirect; while direct communication can exist in art, that which transforms an intentional communication into art is its indirectness. In film, for example, certain movies are clearly direct intentional communication, and are thus not understood to be art, while certain movies are very intentional communications-- and yet the communication is entirely indirect, such as in Maya Deren's Meshes of the Afternoon (which you really should watch). As this example hopefully illustrates, direct communication is necessarily not art, whereas indirect communication can be art if it is intentional.

Some interesting things result from this. First, a painting itself would not be art; rather, the communication-- the experience, perhaps, or maybe the performance-- would be the art. This would be in coherence with my understanding of nominalist theory. Additionally, I think that early cave paintings would not be considered art, unless they were doing more than sheer direct illustration. Lastly, good analytic philosophy would necessarily not be art (if I understand correctly), because I think that it attempts to be as direct as possible, whereas continental philosophy-- such as the works of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche-- has the potential for actually being art and philosophy at the same time, as some of their philosophical contributions are intentional, yet indirect.

Coming Up: Ontology and Epistemology of Mathematics!

Greetings,

The study of mathematics raises all sorts of philosophical questions, some of which we will be discussing at the next Philosophy Club meeting, Monday, September 21 at 8:00pm. It should be a lot of fun! If you need location information, send me an email, and I'll give you the relevant info.

Zach's Ontology of Truth

Greetings once again, everyone,

Last night's meeting on the philosophical implications of the governmental censorship of obscenity was evocative, edgy, and yet hopefully still both fun and educational.

After the meeting, a few of us hung out and discussed something I had been pondering for some time, but had not actually written out until earlier that day: my proposed ontology of truth. For those who don't know, "ontology" refers to the science or study of the nature of existence. This is not an ontological argument for truth; rather, it is an attempt at classifying what I believe are actual kinds of truths.




Let the predicate "P" refer to "...Coheres with...", so that "Pxy" refers to "x coheres with y".
Let the predicate "S" refer to "...Is a statement", so that "Sx" refers to "x is a statement".
For "Objective Truths", let "T" refer to the one-place predicate, "...Is true", so that "Tx" refers to "x is true".
For "Subjective Truths", let "T" refer to the two-place predicate, "...Is true for...", so that "Txy" refers to "x is true for y".
In these propositions, "x" refers to statements that individuals make, and this test seeks to show whether a statement "x" is.
In these propositions, "y" can be interpreted different ways, depending on your approach to various epistemological issues. I personally find it easiest to think of "y" as a paradigm, as Kuhn considered it. If you have issues with Kuhn's summation of paradigms, think of "y" as a worldview or a summation of perceptions of sorts.
In these propositions, "z" refers to a a subject. "Txz" would thus mean that "x is true for z".

That should hopefully do it. If anyone has a hard time reading the image or interpreting the notation, let me know, and I'm happy to help.

At any rate, here's the gist. Note that the examples I provide are not meant to be insightful and provocative insomuch as they are meant to be noncontroversial. The difficult questions can come later.
For x to be an Objectively Absolute truth, it must correspond to all y paradigms that correspond with reality. If there exists a y paradigm that corresponds with reality, but x does not correspond with this y paradigm, x is not an Objectively Absolute truth. Most (if not all) mathematical axioms, such as that the successor of zero does not equal zero, would fall under this category.

For x to be an Objectively Relative truth, it must correspond to at least one y paradigm that corresponds with reality. If there exists a y paradigm that corresponds with reality, but x does not correspond with this y paradigm, this is not a problem, because this truth is relative. There are possible worlds, perhaps, where paradigm y does not correspond with reality; nevertheless, y corresponds to some reality, so x is true, at least in an Objectively Relative sense. As an example of an Objectively Relative truth, consider the statement, "the universe is constantly expanding".

For x to be a Subjectively Absolute truth, it must correspond to all y paradigms that correspond to reality, and there must exist a subject such that x is true for that subject. These truths require a subject in order for them to be true. For example, consider, "I ought not do that which is wrong". Such a statement requires the existence of a subject, an "I", in order for it to be possibly true. If there does not exist a z such that, for z, this x statement is true for z, x is not true at all.

For x to be a Subjectively Relative truth, it must correspond to at least one y paradigm that corresponds with reality and there must exist a subject such that x is true for that subject. As an example of a Subjectively Relative truth, consider, "Ice cream is my favorite cold desert". This statement corresponds with a y paradigm-- my current one-- that also corresponds with reality. However, at a future point, that y might no longer correspond with reality; I might pick a different cold desert as my favorite. Thus, truths under this category are Subjectively Relative, as opposed to Subjectively Absolute.

Thoughts/comments/suggestions? Criticisms? Applause? Disgust? Hunger for ice cream? Thanks for your comments!

An Ontological Argument Against Fatalism

Greetings, once again,

We had an excellent meeting at the Landmark Diner last night; thanks to everyone who showed up! With seven people, our first "Technical Meeting" was a smash success, and I for one got to enjoy a cup of coffee and a nice piece of baklava while waiting.

Our topic for the evening was "fatalism", as it is covered in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The encyclopedia defines fatalism as "the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do", which certainly made for an interesting discussion. After much dialogue, our group came to the conclusion that either fatalism is necessarily true or it is necessarily false, and that, if it is necessarily true, morality/normative claims are necessarily false. I can comment more on how we came to that conclusion if someone desire, but I would instead like to devote some space to developing an argument against fatalism-- my ontological argument against fatalism-- which we had some time to explore at the meeting.

Consider,

"U" refers to "In the understanding". Therefore, "Ux" would mean that "x exists in the understanding". Phrased another way, "I am not only capable of understanding the concept of x, but actually possess an understanding of it".

"f" refers to "freedom".

"a" refers to "fatalism"

"<>", my best attempt at an ASCII diamond, means "logically possible". <>Ux means that "It is logically possible that x exists in the understanding"

"[]", my best attempt at an ASCII square, means "necessarily". []Ux means that "x necessarily exists in the understanding".

"~" refers to negation. ~a means "not fatalism"-- that is, if "fatalism" is true, then "not fatalism" is false, and vice versa.

"<->" refers to a biconditional, "...if and only if...". "a <-> f" means, "a is true if and only if f is true".

Lastly, "->" refers to a conditional, "if...then" statement. "a->f" means, "if a is true, then f is true".

So, on to the argument.

1. Uf
2. Uf -> <>f
3. ~([]a <-> <>f)
Thus, 4. ~a


I'll break it down.

1. "I understand the idea of freedom". While not necessarily obvious, I believe that a charitable proponent of fatalism might grant this premise. Nevertheless, it could certainly be attacked. I think it fair and in good faith, though, as a starting place.

2. "If I understand the idea of freedom, there exists the logical possibility that freedom exists". Regardless of whether fatalism actually is necessarily true, I can imagine a world wherein freedom exists, and there is nothing necessarily contradictory about this world; therefore, it is logically possible, even if not in actuality.

3. "It is not the case that 'fatalism is necessarily true' and 'freedom possibly is true' can both be true at the same time". If fatalism is true, it is not possible that humans are free, by sheer definition. The mere possibility of freedom negates fatalism in its most basic form.

4. Thus, "Fatalism is not true".

What do you all think? There's further argument I could make, but I'd love to read some comments. Thanks!

New Officers for Philosophy & Religion Club

On April 3, four students were elected as the club's officers for 2008-2009. They are:

President: Abbi Butcher
Vice President: Zach Sherwin
Secretary: Will Harper
Tresurer: Tricia Steele

Congratulations to the new officers and to all the nominees for their willingness to serve.

We also would like to thank our outgoing officers who led the club this year and helped to make the spring semester especially successful and active. Most of the current officers will be graduating this semester, so we also wish them well in the future.

The club plans to have one more meeting this semester--a cookout. Date and time TBA.

Philosophy of Law

We had a tremendous showing at last week's Philosophy of Law discussion. The pizza was piping hot and the conversation was spirited. After an hour of group discussion the event was officially concluded, although many gathered in small groups and continued the conversation.

The questions we explored cycled round and round. What does the history of war reveal about human nature? Is this human nature good? Is it changeable? What makes a just war? Is there ever such a thing as just war? And if all wars are unjust, how else can conflict be resolved? Is this possible given our human nature? And so on and so on.

Four faculty members joined and were a boon to the conversation - Sharon Mattila, Scott Segrest, our Dean (and acting club advisor) Tom Kennedy, and discussion leader Michael Papazian. Following the discussion time, it was suggested that we look into bringing notable pacifist/just war proponent/realist to debate the issue as a campus event. Several names were suggested, and it is our hope as officers to follow through with this goal.

As a first event, this was a tremendous success! It is our hope that every participant felt welcomed to join the discussion and bettered by it. But it is true that sometimes written discourse is needed, so if you have a thought from last Thursday night's discussion that you didn't get to share, or lingering questions or thoughts, reply to this post and keep the conversation going...

-tricia