"Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology": What's the Difference?

Greetings,

Your experience might differ, but I find that those with a passion for philosophy (including the philosophy of religion) tend not to share a passion for theology, and vice versa. This has sparked a question in my mind: what is the difference between "philosophy of religion" and "theology"? In this post, propose a theory that hopefully gives us a satisfactory answer. I propose that, in order to understand the difference between "philosophy of religion" and "theology", you ought to accept the following:

1. "Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology" both refer to logically consistent inquiries, which usually take the form of arguments.

2. The subject of the inquiries of both "Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology" is the same: divinity. This is, presumably, a subset of the supernatural.

3. As the subject of both inquiries is the same, the differentiating factor must lie in the form of the inquiry itself.

4. Inquiries can only prove the veracity of their conclusions if the negation of the conclusion yields a contradiction.

5. The only truths philosophy has available are those which are tautologically true-- that is, true by nature of their logical form. The proposition, (a) or [not (a)], is true by nature of its form. Yes, this seems to entail classical logic, although the truth is that it need not. Roll with me, here.

6. Theology has all philosophical truths available to it (that is, theology does not embrace contradictory claims).

7. The truthfulness of premises in a philosophical argument can only be evaluated in terms of their internal/external logical consistency.

8. Here's where the difference lies: Theological claims can also form inquiries where the truthfulness of a premise is not determined simply by logical consistency.

By now, you're saying... "Zach, this is too much. Break it down for me". To quote Dale Cooper... "Okay."

1. All arguments that are sound in the philosophy of religion are sound in theology.
2. Not all arguments that are sound in theology are sound in the philosophy of religion.

Example of a Philosophical Argument
1. Either God exists or he does not.
2. If God exists in possibility, he exists in necessity.
3. It's possible that God exists.
4. Thus, God exists necessarily.

This argument may not be sound, but it can be understood and evaluated in philosophical terms. An individual might critique the second or third premise, but his critique would be grounded in logic.

Example of a Theological Argument
1. Either humans are predestined or they are to be held responsible.
2. God holds humans responsible.
3. God does what he ought to do.
4. Thus, humans are not predestined.

Philosophically, this is not an interesting argument. Premises 2 and 3 are determined to be true or false depending on adherence to religious principles, not logical necessity. However, this argument can be converted into a philosophical argument...

Example of a Philosophical Argument
1, Either humans are predestined or they are to be held responsible
2. Thus, if [God exists] and [God holds humans responsible] and [God does what he ought to do], then humans are not predestined.

This is actually philosophically interesting-- it doesn't presuppose the existence of God, but is concerned with logical entailment if he does exist (and other premises follow).

In conclusion, all truths determined through the philosophy of religion are true according to theological inquiry as well, as theology has all the tools of philosophy of religion available. However, not all truths revealed by theological inquiries are true in accordance with the philosophy of religion. It may be possible to convert these to philosophical claims, but the inquiry loses some of its impact.

Thoughts/comments/suggestions/criticisms will be much appreciated!

The Rabbi, the Pope, and C.S. Lewis

No, this is not a joke! I recently finished reading Pope Benedict XVI's book Jesus of Nazareth. It is an excellent book and I recommend it highly. The most fascinating part for me was the pope's discussion of a book by Rabbi Jacob Neusner, A Rabbi Talks with Jesus. In that book Neusner seeks to explain why, if he had lived in Israel in the time of Jesus, he would not have been one of Jesus' followers. Neusner argues that Jesus is not just another rabbi attempting to reform Judaism and reinterpret the Torah, but is rather rejecting the Torah and its commandments, and attempting to take its place as the center of the Jewish faith. As a Jew loyal to the Torah, Neusner cannot accept Jesus or anyone else who seeks to replace the Torah. Still, Neusner is respectful toward Jesus and even says that he honors him and wishes him well.

Clearly, Benedict was impressed by Neusner's openness to rational engagement with and respect for Jesus. The pope makes the point that Neusner has understood that the Gospel of Matthew (on which Neusner bases his portrayal of Jesus) identifies Jesus with God, and it is only because Jesus saw himself as God that he can make the claims he does about Jewish law. In Benedict's view, Neusner has seen what many modern New Testament scholars and Christian theologians do not see--that interpreting Jesus as a liberal rabbi continuous with the tradition of Judaism rather than a disruption is untenable and even insulting to Jews who reject Jesus.

After reading the pope's book (I don't have Neusner's book yet but will order it soon) I read an interesting critique of Neusner by Rabbi Meir Soloveichik in the January 2008 issue of First Things. Soloveichik faults Neusner for his claim to honor Jesus and wish him well. According to Soloveichik, since Neusner acknowledges that Jesus claimed to be God, he cannot escape C.S. Lewis' famous trilemma from Mere Christianity: a man claiming to be the Son of God must either be the Son of God or a lunatic or the devil. Having rejected the first option, Neusner is stuck honoring and befriending either a madman or Satan, an absurd stance.

But is that right? I must confess (this might be considered heresy around here) I've never been convinced by Lewis' argument. Why is it absurd to respect someone who claims to be divine? Most of the pagan Roman emperors claimed divinity and were worshipped. Many of them, to be sure, were lunatics. But I still admire and respect Marcus Aurelius, who for all his many faults was a serious philosopher with many interesting things to say. If that's acceptable, why can't Neusner or any one else who denies the divinity of Christ nevertheless respect and honor him? So I'm with Neusner and Benedict on this point rather than Soloveichik and Lewis.

A final point: this intellectual encounter between Neusner, Benedict, and Soloveichik is the best interfaith dialogue I have found. Such dialogue tends usually to be burdened by a preordained relativism that prevents genuine debate. Happily that was not the case here.