Primordial Assumptions and Non-Falsifiable Objections

Greetings,

It is common to make several assumptions when discussing philosophical matters-- whether one's interest is ontological, epistemological, formally logical, or some other field, primordial assumptions are a key underlying element. These assumptions are fundamental to our experience of the world, and thus tend not to be challenged further unless they are the specific matter of inquiry, because to do so would drastically shift the inquiry and possibly send a skeptic down a "rabbit hole" (as I call them) where an unceasing flurry of questions, each causing another question, that result in a completely unproductive endeavor with all participants exhausted and discouraged. Examples I have seen fellow discussants perform in conversations include challenging the law of noncontradiction, denying the legitimacy of free will, and proposing that everything "is a dream" while discussing other topics. It is, of course, completely legitimate to discuss these issues when they are the focus or topic of conversation. However, when one discusses an argument for the existence of God or the nature of animal ethics, challenging a core assumption by claiming that everything is just a dream seems both counterproductive and, perhaps, ad hoc, as the claims tend not to be considered legitimate outside of the specific conversation. I would pay money to see what would happen if you commit perjury by stating that you didn't see a crime, and later deny that you committed perjury by asserting that the law of noncontradiction is illegitimate.

On the other hand, we want our arguments to be falsifiable, and thus to be able to deal with objections. If I argue that humans do not have ethical obligations to animals because animals do not have free will, but I imply that humans do have ethical obligations to each other (because they have free will), it seems relevant to bring the question of fatalism into the picture. And yet, here we seem to have a quandary: if free will does not exist, we cannot concede the argument as being valid or invalid on the basis of the validity of the argument (rather, one was compelled to evaluate the argument in the matter one evaluated it, regardless of the ontological validity of the argument). As such, we lose our capacity to evaluate the argument. It would seem that the individual who challenges free will thus cannot meet the standard of falsifiability-- their argument cannot be falsified if there is no free will, because there is no one to falsify it. However, the fatalism objection seems both coherent and relevant. A topic can become controversial when it is not falsifiable; how much more difficult a topic becomes when one of its most coherent objections is not falsifiable!

What tactic should we take when we a legitimate topic has a non-falsifiable objection thrust at it? Do we deny the legitimacy of the objection, or treat it with all seriousness? Do we disregard it as sophistry, or do we attempt to account for it? It's a topic of both practical and theoretical interest to me, and I look forward to your feedback.

EDIT: On a completely unrelated note, here's a rather disturbing document you should probably see, about one of our favorite meeting locations...
http://ga.state.gegov.com/_templates/87/Food/_report_full.cfm?fsimID=1441174&domainID=87&rtype=food

In Response to S. Dietz's Comment on Falsifiability

The following addresses a reader's concerns with my argument found in my argument on Falsifiability in Wilson's Biological Ethics. I would highly recommend reading the original before reading my additional comments. However, given that the questions posed were of significant concern with regards to the clarity and validity of my original post, I decided that they merited an additional new topic. If the powers that be decide otherwise, feel free to transfer this to a comment in the original post.

S. Dietz,

Thanks for your comments; they are much appreciated! If you don't mind, I'll try to address them as best I can...

I feel that the thesis of your essay hinges on the idea that because it is impossible to find something to falsify the argument then the argument is not falsifiable.

What you stated is, to a certain degree, accurate. However, I'm not merely saying that it is impossible to find something to falsify, but that the theory is capable of being justified, regardless of any attempt at falsification-- it is too subjective to be scientific.

If you are arguing that because his theory is scientifically based that it needs to be falsifiable, I need you to tell me if you are basing this on scientific testability standards or on logical soundness.

Indeed, you summarized it quite nicely; I am, in fact, arguing that science ought to be falsifiable, and that, given that he claims that everything (literally, including arts, ethics, religion, and etcetera) can be explained through biological science, his theory ought to hold to the rigorous standards of science. I believe that I argued why this is the case by providing the example of astrology, which is not a science, as it is not falsifiable. By “falsifiable” I refer specifically to logical falsifiability; a statement is logically falsifiable if, to quote Theo Kupiers in “General Philosophy of Science” on page 518, if there is “at least one conceivable observation contradicting it”. So, “unicorns exist” is falsifiable, because there at least one conceivable observation where there are no unicorns in the universe. However, I would argue that “2+2=4” is not falsifiable (one cannot conceive a world where it is false), so though it is true, it is not scientific. Wilson tried to argue that science can establish ethics, but tried to argue that the science is unscientific (unfalsifiable), therefore establishing a contradiction, meaning that it is necessarily false.

At least, that was the gist of my argument, best as I could make it.

Other than that, however, I think it was very well written. I especially value the parsimony of your essay, because some papers I have had to read just went on and on and on...

Much appreciated; thanks so much!

On Falsifiability in Wilson's Biological Ethics

Greetings,

First, I wish to thank all who were able to attend the Philosophy Club meeting last night; it was a fascinating and genuinely productive meeting concerning E.O. Wilson’s argument that ethics and religion stem from biological roots. I wish to especially thank Dr. and Mrs. Graham from the Biology department, Dr. Knowlton of the Anthropology department, Dr. Mattila from the religion department, and Dr. Papazian, our club sponsor, from the Philosophy department.

One of the concepts discussed at the meeting was the issue of whether or not the argument for biological ethics is falsifiable. I believe that this is an important point to talk about, and merits a bit of fleshing out for further insight into the issues at hand. First, I shall describe at the least (and define at the best) falsifiability, and then argue why falsifiability is distinctively important for Wilson’s argument. Lastly, I shall show why I believe his argument is not falsifiable, and thus philosophically uninteresting at best.

Falsifiability refers to whether there exists any criteria under which an argument can be shown to be false. For an example, the following argument is falsifiable:

1. Where there is fire, there is oxygen.
2. There is oxygen here.
3. Therefore, there is fire here.

This argument is falsifiable if it can be shown that there is oxygen in a place where there is no fire; similarly, one could construct a simple logical argument to show where the fallacy lies (A->B, B, therefore A is not logically valid). Falsifiability is particularly important in relation to the sciences, as a scientific study that is not falsifiable—such as Astrology—would generally be considered pseudoscientific. Similarly, the intelligent design argument that the world was created to look and act as if it was extremely old (I’m leaving this ambiguous on purpose; assume greater than 10,000 years, for the sake of argument), although this is a deception by its creator might be plausible, but is certainly not falsifiable, and thus would not be scientifically interesting.

Wilson attempts to claim that all forms of human ethics can be explained through biological roots. He does not necessarily take the genetic-imperativist stance of Richard Dawkins, but nevertheless contends that every existent given religion, culture, or ethical imperative can be justified biologically. However, this presents a problem: can Wilson’s claim be made falsifiable? Wilson states yes; he argues that, if a religious, cultural, or ethical act cannot be accounted for through biological ethics, then his theory is falsified.

However, I do not buy his argument, and I don’t think the rest of the group did, either. The criteria used to establish whether an argument can be justified under the terms of falsifiability he established seem intentionally and maliciously vague; is it not possible to justify or explain any given action as biological, given enough creativity? This seems strikingly similar to the intelligent design argument mentioned earlier—show something that a creator could not have deceived us about and the argument is false. In fact, this argument might be more falsifiable than Wilson’s, as at least there exist relatively (depending on your philosophical inclinations) certain and stable criteria for establishing deception.

Wilson’s argument, in terms of falsifiability, stands against Occam’s Razor and common sense. I think that his argument may or may not have merit; I am not knowledgeable enough in biology and biohistory to offer an authoritative opinion. What I am certain of, however, is that he failed to establish a system that I personally find convincing, for it seems incapable of holding up to the standards it ought. As his argument is scientifically grounded and grown, and falsifiability is vital to science, falsifiability is essential to the quality of his argument. Given that the argument fails this criteria, it appears far less philosophically interesting than I originally had thought, although the implications from it might nevertheless merit philosophical investigation.

Thoughts/comments/suggestions/feedback? Please comment below, or email me at zsherwin berry.edu. Thanks!