Primordial Assumptions and Non-Falsifiable Objections

Greetings,

It is common to make several assumptions when discussing philosophical matters-- whether one's interest is ontological, epistemological, formally logical, or some other field, primordial assumptions are a key underlying element. These assumptions are fundamental to our experience of the world, and thus tend not to be challenged further unless they are the specific matter of inquiry, because to do so would drastically shift the inquiry and possibly send a skeptic down a "rabbit hole" (as I call them) where an unceasing flurry of questions, each causing another question, that result in a completely unproductive endeavor with all participants exhausted and discouraged. Examples I have seen fellow discussants perform in conversations include challenging the law of noncontradiction, denying the legitimacy of free will, and proposing that everything "is a dream" while discussing other topics. It is, of course, completely legitimate to discuss these issues when they are the focus or topic of conversation. However, when one discusses an argument for the existence of God or the nature of animal ethics, challenging a core assumption by claiming that everything is just a dream seems both counterproductive and, perhaps, ad hoc, as the claims tend not to be considered legitimate outside of the specific conversation. I would pay money to see what would happen if you commit perjury by stating that you didn't see a crime, and later deny that you committed perjury by asserting that the law of noncontradiction is illegitimate.

On the other hand, we want our arguments to be falsifiable, and thus to be able to deal with objections. If I argue that humans do not have ethical obligations to animals because animals do not have free will, but I imply that humans do have ethical obligations to each other (because they have free will), it seems relevant to bring the question of fatalism into the picture. And yet, here we seem to have a quandary: if free will does not exist, we cannot concede the argument as being valid or invalid on the basis of the validity of the argument (rather, one was compelled to evaluate the argument in the matter one evaluated it, regardless of the ontological validity of the argument). As such, we lose our capacity to evaluate the argument. It would seem that the individual who challenges free will thus cannot meet the standard of falsifiability-- their argument cannot be falsified if there is no free will, because there is no one to falsify it. However, the fatalism objection seems both coherent and relevant. A topic can become controversial when it is not falsifiable; how much more difficult a topic becomes when one of its most coherent objections is not falsifiable!

What tactic should we take when we a legitimate topic has a non-falsifiable objection thrust at it? Do we deny the legitimacy of the objection, or treat it with all seriousness? Do we disregard it as sophistry, or do we attempt to account for it? It's a topic of both practical and theoretical interest to me, and I look forward to your feedback.

EDIT: On a completely unrelated note, here's a rather disturbing document you should probably see, about one of our favorite meeting locations...
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"Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology": What's the Difference?

Greetings,

Your experience might differ, but I find that those with a passion for philosophy (including the philosophy of religion) tend not to share a passion for theology, and vice versa. This has sparked a question in my mind: what is the difference between "philosophy of religion" and "theology"? In this post, propose a theory that hopefully gives us a satisfactory answer. I propose that, in order to understand the difference between "philosophy of religion" and "theology", you ought to accept the following:

1. "Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology" both refer to logically consistent inquiries, which usually take the form of arguments.

2. The subject of the inquiries of both "Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology" is the same: divinity. This is, presumably, a subset of the supernatural.

3. As the subject of both inquiries is the same, the differentiating factor must lie in the form of the inquiry itself.

4. Inquiries can only prove the veracity of their conclusions if the negation of the conclusion yields a contradiction.

5. The only truths philosophy has available are those which are tautologically true-- that is, true by nature of their logical form. The proposition, (a) or [not (a)], is true by nature of its form. Yes, this seems to entail classical logic, although the truth is that it need not. Roll with me, here.

6. Theology has all philosophical truths available to it (that is, theology does not embrace contradictory claims).

7. The truthfulness of premises in a philosophical argument can only be evaluated in terms of their internal/external logical consistency.

8. Here's where the difference lies: Theological claims can also form inquiries where the truthfulness of a premise is not determined simply by logical consistency.

By now, you're saying... "Zach, this is too much. Break it down for me". To quote Dale Cooper... "Okay."

1. All arguments that are sound in the philosophy of religion are sound in theology.
2. Not all arguments that are sound in theology are sound in the philosophy of religion.

Example of a Philosophical Argument
1. Either God exists or he does not.
2. If God exists in possibility, he exists in necessity.
3. It's possible that God exists.
4. Thus, God exists necessarily.

This argument may not be sound, but it can be understood and evaluated in philosophical terms. An individual might critique the second or third premise, but his critique would be grounded in logic.

Example of a Theological Argument
1. Either humans are predestined or they are to be held responsible.
2. God holds humans responsible.
3. God does what he ought to do.
4. Thus, humans are not predestined.

Philosophically, this is not an interesting argument. Premises 2 and 3 are determined to be true or false depending on adherence to religious principles, not logical necessity. However, this argument can be converted into a philosophical argument...

Example of a Philosophical Argument
1, Either humans are predestined or they are to be held responsible
2. Thus, if [God exists] and [God holds humans responsible] and [God does what he ought to do], then humans are not predestined.

This is actually philosophically interesting-- it doesn't presuppose the existence of God, but is concerned with logical entailment if he does exist (and other premises follow).

In conclusion, all truths determined through the philosophy of religion are true according to theological inquiry as well, as theology has all the tools of philosophy of religion available. However, not all truths revealed by theological inquiries are true in accordance with the philosophy of religion. It may be possible to convert these to philosophical claims, but the inquiry loses some of its impact.

Thoughts/comments/suggestions/criticisms will be much appreciated!

Seven Motivations for Philosophizing

Greetings,

I suspect that there are a vast multitude of reasons for the study and/or practice of philosophy. I thought it would be interesting to survey a few of the different approaches. In the comments, feel free to address any/all you would care to, as well as suggest additional motivations that I may have missed.

1. Edification
Those whose motivation is edification believe that philosophy can provide a sort of sustenance, whether for the mind or soul. They pursue it in hopes of an upbuilding, a strengthening, and/or and endowing that stems from their studies. An example of one who believes philosophy to be edifiying is Kierkegaard (who argued that Hegel, for example, was an excellent professor of philosophy but a poor philosopher, because there was no edification through his system).

2. To Discover Truth
Those whose motivation is to discover truth believe that, to quote Muldur from the X-Files (rock on), "the truth is out there". Whether metaphysics or ontology, they believe that arguments can-- in truth-- be sound, as opposed to merely valid, for there are concrete propositions that have a definite truth-value. It is possible to pursue edification but not truth, as I would argue that Nietzsche did. It is possible to pursue truth but not edification, as I believe Hegel did. An example of one who pursued philosophy to study truth is Hegel.

3. To affect policy/habits, and/or to better society.
Those whose motivation is to affect policy/habits, and/or to better society, believe that philosophical study and work can have tangible benefits. They believe that people can be served, and tangible, positive results brought forth, from such pursuits. It is possible to have this motivation but not pursue edification, such as those who disavow the soul but argue that agents can still be held accountable for their actions. Aristotle is an example of a philosophy with this motivation, and his primary concern was to affect social ethics through habituation.

4. To create "truth".
Those whose motivation is to create truth believe that "truthfulness" is intrinsically tied to perception, and one can actually modify the truthfulness of a statement by adjusting the perception of that statement. According to those who pursue philosophy to create "truth", humans define what does and does not have value and what that value/those values is/are. I believe that Foucault and Derrida are examples of philosophers with this motivation, although I only have a basic knowledge of them both.

5. Because it is interesting.
Those whose motivation is to study systems believe that philosophy is worth pursuing because it is interesting, regardless of whether or not it is edifying, a method of revealing truth, or et cetera. Some may pursue systematism, such as analytical logicians, while others may abstractly consider broad metaphysical issues. I might include Lewis Carroll in this category, although I'm sure that will be controversial (both his inclusion as a philosopher and the claim about his primary motivation).

6. To earn income.
Haha... I kid!

Seriously, though, there is money to be made via philosophy. Ranging from research into formal logic yielding jobs in IT to professorship, it's not a bad way to make a living. That being said, it's probably not the most efficient method of earning an income, but it could certainly be a secondary method. Unless you're someone like Saul Kripke, in which case you could probably focus on this and do quite well for yourself.

7. To have something to do.
Honestly, I believe that some people engage in philosophy because it keeps them from being bored. This does not mean that they find it interesting, but it can be used as a tool to abstract themselves away from reality and have one more habit to get through life. Call me crazy, but I have a secret (well, secret no more) hunch that Wittgenstein might fall into this camp. Feel free to reject that association, if you see fit.