On Falsifiability in Wilson's Biological Ethics

Greetings,

First, I wish to thank all who were able to attend the Philosophy Club meeting last night; it was a fascinating and genuinely productive meeting concerning E.O. Wilson’s argument that ethics and religion stem from biological roots. I wish to especially thank Dr. and Mrs. Graham from the Biology department, Dr. Knowlton of the Anthropology department, Dr. Mattila from the religion department, and Dr. Papazian, our club sponsor, from the Philosophy department.

One of the concepts discussed at the meeting was the issue of whether or not the argument for biological ethics is falsifiable. I believe that this is an important point to talk about, and merits a bit of fleshing out for further insight into the issues at hand. First, I shall describe at the least (and define at the best) falsifiability, and then argue why falsifiability is distinctively important for Wilson’s argument. Lastly, I shall show why I believe his argument is not falsifiable, and thus philosophically uninteresting at best.

Falsifiability refers to whether there exists any criteria under which an argument can be shown to be false. For an example, the following argument is falsifiable:

1. Where there is fire, there is oxygen.
2. There is oxygen here.
3. Therefore, there is fire here.

This argument is falsifiable if it can be shown that there is oxygen in a place where there is no fire; similarly, one could construct a simple logical argument to show where the fallacy lies (A->B, B, therefore A is not logically valid). Falsifiability is particularly important in relation to the sciences, as a scientific study that is not falsifiable—such as Astrology—would generally be considered pseudoscientific. Similarly, the intelligent design argument that the world was created to look and act as if it was extremely old (I’m leaving this ambiguous on purpose; assume greater than 10,000 years, for the sake of argument), although this is a deception by its creator might be plausible, but is certainly not falsifiable, and thus would not be scientifically interesting.

Wilson attempts to claim that all forms of human ethics can be explained through biological roots. He does not necessarily take the genetic-imperativist stance of Richard Dawkins, but nevertheless contends that every existent given religion, culture, or ethical imperative can be justified biologically. However, this presents a problem: can Wilson’s claim be made falsifiable? Wilson states yes; he argues that, if a religious, cultural, or ethical act cannot be accounted for through biological ethics, then his theory is falsified.

However, I do not buy his argument, and I don’t think the rest of the group did, either. The criteria used to establish whether an argument can be justified under the terms of falsifiability he established seem intentionally and maliciously vague; is it not possible to justify or explain any given action as biological, given enough creativity? This seems strikingly similar to the intelligent design argument mentioned earlier—show something that a creator could not have deceived us about and the argument is false. In fact, this argument might be more falsifiable than Wilson’s, as at least there exist relatively (depending on your philosophical inclinations) certain and stable criteria for establishing deception.

Wilson’s argument, in terms of falsifiability, stands against Occam’s Razor and common sense. I think that his argument may or may not have merit; I am not knowledgeable enough in biology and biohistory to offer an authoritative opinion. What I am certain of, however, is that he failed to establish a system that I personally find convincing, for it seems incapable of holding up to the standards it ought. As his argument is scientifically grounded and grown, and falsifiability is vital to science, falsifiability is essential to the quality of his argument. Given that the argument fails this criteria, it appears far less philosophically interesting than I originally had thought, although the implications from it might nevertheless merit philosophical investigation.

Thoughts/comments/suggestions/feedback? Please comment below, or email me at zsherwin berry.edu. Thanks!