Greetings,
Your experience might differ, but I find that those with a passion for philosophy (including the philosophy of religion) tend not to share a passion for theology, and vice versa. This has sparked a question in my mind: what is the difference between "philosophy of religion" and "theology"? In this post, propose a theory that hopefully gives us a satisfactory answer. I propose that, in order to understand the difference between "philosophy of religion" and "theology", you ought to accept the following:
1. "Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology" both refer to logically consistent inquiries, which usually take the form of arguments.
2. The subject of the inquiries of both "Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology" is the same: divinity. This is, presumably, a subset of the supernatural.
3. As the subject of both inquiries is the same, the differentiating factor must lie in the form of the inquiry itself.
4. Inquiries can only prove the veracity of their conclusions if the negation of the conclusion yields a contradiction.
5. The only truths philosophy has available are those which are tautologically true-- that is, true by nature of their logical form. The proposition, (a) or [not (a)], is true by nature of its form. Yes, this seems to entail classical logic, although the truth is that it need not. Roll with me, here.
6. Theology has all philosophical truths available to it (that is, theology does not embrace contradictory claims).
7. The truthfulness of premises in a philosophical argument can only be evaluated in terms of their internal/external logical consistency.
8. Here's where the difference lies: Theological claims can also form inquiries where the truthfulness of a premise is not determined simply by logical consistency.
By now, you're saying... "Zach, this is too much. Break it down for me". To quote Dale Cooper... "Okay."
1. All arguments that are sound in the philosophy of religion are sound in theology.
2. Not all arguments that are sound in theology are sound in the philosophy of religion.
Example of a Philosophical Argument
1. Either God exists or he does not.
2. If God exists in possibility, he exists in necessity.
3. It's possible that God exists.
4. Thus, God exists necessarily.
This argument may not be sound, but it can be understood and evaluated in philosophical terms. An individual might critique the second or third premise, but his critique would be grounded in logic.
Example of a Theological Argument
1. Either humans are predestined or they are to be held responsible.
2. God holds humans responsible.
3. God does what he ought to do.
4. Thus, humans are not predestined.
Philosophically, this is not an interesting argument. Premises 2 and 3 are determined to be true or false depending on adherence to religious principles, not logical necessity. However, this argument can be converted into a philosophical argument...
Example of a Philosophical Argument
1, Either humans are predestined or they are to be held responsible
2. Thus, if [God exists] and [God holds humans responsible] and [God does what he ought to do], then humans are not predestined.
This is actually philosophically interesting-- it doesn't presuppose the existence of God, but is concerned with logical entailment if he does exist (and other premises follow).
In conclusion, all truths determined through the philosophy of religion are true according to theological inquiry as well, as theology has all the tools of philosophy of religion available. However, not all truths revealed by theological inquiries are true in accordance with the philosophy of religion. It may be possible to convert these to philosophical claims, but the inquiry loses some of its impact.
Thoughts/comments/suggestions/criticisms will be much appreciated!
Friday, October 29, 2010
"Philosophy of Religion" and "Theology": What's the Difference?
Posted by Zach Sherwin at 10:53 AM
Labels: christian theology, metaphilosophy, philosophy of religion, truth
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9 comments:
An interesting post. I'm not sure that one can draw a clear boundary between philosophy of religion and theology (or more properly, philosophical theology). There are many kinds of theology (biblical theology, historical theology) that are more remote from philosophy, but what is called "philosophical theology" often is very close to philosophy of religion.
I usually think that theology starts out with premises that assume the truth of claims of revelation or particular religious propositions rather than premises that are either logically true or empirical (not merely tautologies). So an argument that begins with premises that assume the Trinity would be theological, although an argument that attempted through means of reason alone to establish that the Trinity is logically consistent would be philosophy of religion (or philosophy of Christianity). The philosophical argument would simply start with a definition of the Trinity without an assumption that there is a God that is a Trinity.
I like your distinction between philosophy and theology but I have one question. Does premise two of the philosophical argument, if god exists in possibility, he exists in necessity, require a religous underpining to the definition of god? That is, a person's definition of God is dependant on religous assumptions. This makes me think the philosophy/theology distinction closer than you make it out to be in your post.
The same problem seems to come up between philosophy of science and science. For example, the definition of the mind, used in the philosophy of the mind (a subset of the philosophy of science), is dependant on its nature as a physical phenominon; and the nature of physical phenominons are understood in scientific(psychological) terms.
Ray and Dr. Papazian, thanks for the comments!
Ray, I don't believe that one must make religious assumptions to define God. Ideally, a person's definition of God is not contingent upon religious assumptions. If that were the case, Christians and Muslims could not rationally debate the existence of God, for their religious assumptions would preclude them from having meaningful dialogue about the subject. I'm thinking along the lines of Wittgenstein's beetle-in-a-box thought experiment. If our definitions were "private", meaningful exchange would be all but halted about the subject.
That doesn't preclude the possibility of disagreeing on the proper instantiation of a definition. You and I (hopefully) agree on the definition of a "King", but we might disagree on whether Richard or John is king. Similarly, atheists and theists hopefully are in general agreement on a definition of God/god/Gods/gods, but disagree on the manifestation of them in the actual world.
As an analogy, consider the Loch Ness Monster. I'm quite confident that people, due to "experiences" (even if they were crazy/deceived at the time), genuinely believe in the Loch Ness Monster, due to their experiences. However, we do not disagree with them on their definition of the monster, despite their having substantially different experiences; we merely disagree with the manifestation of the monster in reality.
Right.
I agree with Dr. Papazian who is offering a similar proposition as Dr. Mckenzie on the importance of understanding the framework which one is studying. With each their exists particular rules which one can thus make claims about.
I think that you are taking a lenient interpretation of Wittgenstein's beetle in the box thought experiment. An extreme interpretation would dictate that it is not true that Christians and Muslims can rationally debate the existence of God. Strict interpretationalists on both sides disagree on fundamental attributes of god which would alter their definitions of Him and affect their philosophical inquiry such as the case as to whether god can take on a human form (Jesus); and this is just a problem within the Abrahamic tradition. Just think of the philosophical problems that would arise between a Scientologist and Mormon discussing the issue of Virtue. Similar problems between atheists and theists exist. An atheist may hold the definition of God as a supreme dictator while a theist may assent to the definition that HE is the direct descendant of the Emperor of Armuchee. In both cases the concepts of 'divinity' and 'supernatural' are conflicting. A Christian may define God as a very natural entity (a human being named Jesus) where as a Muslim believes God cannot. An atheist may hold the definition of God as divine (a supreme dictator) where as a theist may hold a very earthly definition of God (God is that man that lives in a van down by Armuchee creek).
Ray,
Thanks for the response. I think that we may agree more than we wish to admit... let me argue why. I claim that people agree on definitions but disagree on the instantiations of those definitions. You claim that an atheist may define God as a supreme dictator, while a theist may define God as a man that lives in a van down by Armurchee creek. However, the atheist provided a definition (which we could easily rebut), while the theist merely provided an instantiation of a definition. If a theist defined God as "Jesus", I would tell them that they are mistaken. They think that Jesus is God, not that Jesus defines "God". They have a definition of God, and think Jesus fits that definition. A Muslim thinker would, presumably, have a definition of God, and think that Allah would fit that definition (and that Jesus would not). We're not arguing over definitions, but over the instantiation of those definitions.
Yes, it's theoretically possible that we disagree on the definition, but I don't find it likely that such definitional disagreements are common. If they were, we would have an awful hard time communicating about abstract ideas (and philosophy club would be far less interesting). However, we tend not to disagree on what free will is-- we disagree on whether it exists.
If you said that you defined God as a supreme dictator, I would state that you are incorrect. I can give examples of supreme dictators that are not considered to be God. If you said that a man in a van in Armurchee is God, I would say-- fine. If you defined God as being that man, however, I would say you are crazy. We can construct fictional gods/deities that are not men in vans in creeks in Armurchee.
Once again you have successfully clarified my ramblings into something workable. I admire the confidence you have in human being's logical faculties to produce consistent and unambiguous philisophical language and conversation. Maybe this is my own self projection here but I'm more pessimistc. Without falling into the reletivist quagmire, do you think it is possible that there may exist cross-cultural differences that fundamentaly undermin our commonly held definitions? Let's say there is an extra-terrestrial species (alien x) that lands on your lawn. This alien x has the same access to mathamatical and scientific truths as we do. If alien x spoke to you with no alterior motive to decieve you and said "today is a good day" in his native tongue (which happens to sound exactly like english). Would you believe him?
Ray,
I think you make some legitimate points, and I enjoy the chance to dialogue with you about them. I'll try to be as straightforward in answering your questions as possible:
"Do you think it is possible that there may exist cross-cultural differences that fundamentaly undermine our commonly held definitions?"
The trick here is determining what "fundamentally undermine" means, but I nevertheless would answer, "no," with regard to objective truths. If we are all perceiving the same underlying objective reality, we might have some difficulty getting "on the same page", but I can't foresee any conditions, created by cultural differences, that would make it necessarily impossible to legitimately communicate about words and their references. It may take a whole lot of work, but I am not currently able to conceive a situation like what you're describing. I'm willing to entertain the idea, though-- feel free to try to convince me.
"Let's say there is an extra-terrestrial species (alien x) that lands on your lawn. This alien x has the same access to mathamatical and scientific truths as we do. If alien x spoke to you with no alterior motive to decieve you and said "today is a good day" in his native tongue (which happens to sound exactly like english). Would you believe him?"
If Alien X said, "today is a good day", and we assume the following:
1. It has no ulterior motives
2. It has access to the same mathematical/scientific truths that I do
3. It is rational
4. We can communicate
I would have cause to investigate, but even if he is mistaken, I see no reason why we could not eventually share dialogue. I might remark, "what do you mean by, 'good'?" Now, he might define "good" as being "pleasant and enjoyable; a state that one would be inclined to choose over a non-good state" (my quick attempt at a definition). You could certainly object that, when he says "pleasant" and "enjoyable", he's not referring to the same thing I am-- we should begin an infinite query into meaning! And, since one cannot complete an infinite query, it must therefore be impossible to validate meaning!
I reject that. If that were true, definitions would be meaningless and devoid of substance, because they would not have any references. Imagine if I defined "Quarorglewoggle" as "Gltheltic-giborglewoggle". If you asked me to define "Gltheltic-giborglewoggle", I would continue using nonsense words with no real-world references, and would eventually come back to "Quarorglewoggle". We would thus not be able to have any legitimate knowledge of what is being communicated. In other words, if the skeptical concern is true, we would not have legitimate understanding of the references of others' words. Since we do have legitimate understanding of the references of others' words, it is not the case that the skeptical concern is true (and, thus, the skeptical concern is false).
Back to the alien. We could continue playing word games all day-- or, we could begin to learn each others' meanings as a child does. Slowly, carefully, with many references. We may find some areas where our words do not seem to match, but since we're both progressing in good faith, we would understand the differences and could interpret them into our own tongues. Or, so I think.
This was extremely helpful. I am 16 years old and I want to study theology... Not necessarily a specific religion and its teachings but all religions, their teachings, doctrines and their similarities and differences. So whenever someone asked me what I enjoy doing during my spare time, I wouldn't know whether to tell them I study theology or the philosophy of theology. But now I know, so thanks again!!!!
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