In Jacobellis v. Ohio, US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart claimed that, while he could not concretely define "obscenity", stating, "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [obscenity]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it..."
[Source: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=378&invol=184]
I'm going to argue that this is, in fact, a wise move, although I shall warn you up front that my argument is weak and not the result of much in-depth research and whatnot. Consider, if I stated that an item is necessarily obscene if and only if it has Property P-- or, alternatively, an item is necessarily not obscene if and only if it lacks Property P-- it would be likely that, given the rapid development in communication technology, ways could be found to avoid a work's clear possession of Property P. To concretely define what Property P is, one would be concretely defining obscenity; however, while examples of obscenity might be concrete, new forms might arise, and Property P might prove insufficient to capture a future definition of obscenity. In fact, I believe that an understanding of obscenity necessarily requires a context-- it is subjective, and obscenity cannot be sufficiently understood outside the context it is portrayed in-- thus entailing that obscenity be understood subjectively rather than objectively.
One might object that this makes obscenity relative; after all, two individuals might disagree on whether a work is obscene. However, while contradiction is necessarily a valid attack on arguments in the sphere of objectivity, I argue that such is not the case in the sphere of subjectivity. If I said, "Jeremy Soule's orchestration of Terra is the most beautiful", I might be subjectively right; you might favor Nobuo Uematsu's rendition, and it would be a lie for you to claim any other work as the greatest. Such beliefs are not relative-- they are held by absolute standards; the standards are internal to the individual, however,-- subjective-- as opposed to corresponding with an external law or principle, objectivity. Obscenity is similar.
Thoughts?
Friday, September 11, 2009
Obscenity as Abstraction
Posted by Zach Sherwin at 5:13 PM
Labels: definitions, obscenity
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6 comments:
Perhaps your argument proves too much. Is there something special about obscenity that makes it undefinable or can your reasoning be applied to any definition? That is, if I identify being a bed with a property P, how can I be sure that someone won't make a bed in the future that lacks that property? What's the difference between obscenity and a bed?
Given that the author warns us upfront that his argument is weak, perhaps to respond is to dignify an undeserving post. The Armenian Philosopher has pointed out a difficulty with the author's anti-essentialism. Let me propose another problem:
The author suggest that obscenity is like art and he assumes that when we move to art we move to the subjective. Why should anyone think that? We might be uncertain about whether Soule's or Uematsu's orchestration of Terra is the most beautiful (or even whether beauty is the relevant aesthetic standard here), but it won't follow that we have entered the realm of the subjective. Anyone who prefers Brittany Spears' orchestration of Terra to that of Soule or Uematsu doesn't understand excellence in music.It may be difficult to articulate what makes for excellence with respect to Terra, but it doesn't follow from that that is is merely a subjective matter. (And ponder what kind of agent would ever elevate her subjective standards of anything to the status of absolute!)
Who cares if obscenity is relative? That, by itself, is not an objection.
DunceScotus,
Perhaps I miscommunicated in my post; your counter-arguments do not line up with my arguments, as I'll do my best to explore.
First, I am not advocating anti-essentialism. I am arguing that there is, in fact, a fixed and particular character to obscenity; this character, however, exists in subjectivity. Elements of music certainly can attain objective excellence; for example, one who is adept at maintaining a pitch or deftly manipulating scales is obviously more objectively excellent than one who is not; nevertheless, I am arguing that the perception of a performance's beauty is necessarily subjective. It exists in a state of absolute-- as opposed to relative-- subjectivity, but is subjective nonetheless.
This leads to my second point, that subjectivity is not relativity. According to my understanding of the terms, relativity is a reference to the "What", while subjectivity is a reference to the "How". If I state that morality is relative, I am stating that, with regard to what morality is, there is no absolute external morality. If I state that morality is subjective, however, I argue something very different; the "How" of morality is what I argue about, and this "How" must be understood in its relation to a perceiver. One can contrast objectivity and subjectivity with respect to the "How", and if obscenity is subjective, it might still be absolute. This does mean, however, that it cannot be rationally understood outside of the context of a perceiver.
This discussion would make for a great follow-up blog post, too.
I got to admit that I can't make much sense out of Sherwin's clarification.
Is this a coherent idea: "x has a fixed and particular character and what this fixed and particular character is is not, in fact, fixed and particular but is determined by the relevant subject who thinks about x,"? I think not.
Is this a non-tautological claim: "The perception of a performance's beauty is necessarily subjective"?
Sherwin would seem to understand "absolute subjectivy." Good on him; I don't.
As for Sherwin's understanding of the contrast between subjectivity and relativity, well, alas, I understand that about as well as I understand anything else he has said. Note, however, that he never explains what it might mean for obscenity to be absolutely subjective, he merely asserts this. Here's what looks to me like an absolutely subjective judgment: "Under no imaginable circumstances would I think one should not wear socks." Assume that this is subjective—we couldn't know without asking the person who believes this. One could, but notice how bizarre it would be for one to hold an belief about sock-wearing absolutely. Likewise with obscenity: Sherwin believes that each and every exposure of one's little toe is obscene; under no conditions could he approve of the unveiling of a little toe.
Is this the kind of person with whom one would spend much time in serious philosophical conversation?
I suspect not, but I am, alas, but a dunce.
DunceScotus,
First, please assume that I am writing in good faith, and be charitable to my arguments. I politely request that you refrain from ad hominem attacks-- for example, "Is this the kind of person with whom one would spend much time in serious philosophical conversation? I suspect not, but I am, alas, but a dunce." Making a personal attack on yourself does not justify discrediting another's character. Feel free to disagree with my arguments, or even with the fundamental ties that bind them together; however, let's keep it civil.
That being said, I am very interested in-- and will do my best to-- write a more in-depth post this week arguing for a certain schema or way of understanding subjectivity versus objectivity. It should be very interesting. In the mean time, I will attempt to provide a rather basic response to your comment. However, as the nature of blogs and commenting involves the comments being followups to the centralized post, as opposed to an ongoing conversation, this is not the best medium to carry on an in-depth dialogue.
I am sorry that you do not understand the concept of "absolute subjectivity"; for now, let that rest, and know that I shall deal with it in a future blog post.
The incoherent idea you propose,
"x has a fixed and particular character and what this fixed and particular character is is not, in fact, fixed and particular but is determined by the relevant subject who thinks about x,"
Does not adequately represent my proposal. Rather, "x has a fixed and particular character [absolute], but x must necessarily be understood with the framework of the context of a perceiver [subjective]". Therefore, if there exists a person y such that y perceives x, and x corresponds with the fixed and particular character of obscenity, then x is obscene. However, if there does not exist a y that perceives x, x cannot be obscene.
As an example, suppose that there exists alien race z. Members of the set z find x obscene due to their cultural and anatomical history/make-up/etcetera. Members of the human race, set y, do not find x offensive and have had no contact with z. If a member of z perceives x, they would be telling the truth if they stated that x was obscene. If a member of set y, however, perceived x, they would be incorrect to identify x as obscene (remember, we are assuming no possibility of contact with z, to keep things discrete). X cannot be obscene unless it is understood in the subjective context of the perceiver.
Make sense? Sorry if it doesn't. Hopefully that example was clear enough to at least communicate the idea behind my argument in an intelligible way, even if you disagree on whether the argument is coherent or not.
Of course, my own view is that incivility is absolutely subjective, so I am not sure what the relevance is of Mr. Zach Sherwin's finding my remarks incivil.
But let me suggest, though he will no doubt find this incivil as well, that what Mr. Sherwin identifies as an ad hominem argument is not, in fact, an ad hominem argument (or certainly not an ad hominem argument of a troublesome sort. To declare an argument ad hominem is not to refute the argument, is it?)
Here is the argument:
1. Engaging in philosophical argument is a good use of one's time except when your interlocutor is holding a ludicrous position. (suppressed premise)
2. Holding any absolute beliefs about sock-wearing is ludicrous.
3. Therefore, engaging in philosophical argument with one who holds absolute beliefs about sock-wearing is not a good use of one's time. (from 1 and 2)
4. One should make good use of one's time.
5. Therefore, one should not engage in philosophical conversation with one who holds absolute beliefs about sock-wearing.
This argument may not be sound. Some might argue that the critical second premise is false. But the point is, there's nothing ad hominem about the argument.
Perhaps we should ask ourselves whether the charge of incivility Mr. Sherwin makes against DunceScotus is not, itself, an ad hominem appeal.
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