Saturday, October 3, 2009

Happiness and the Heart of Darkness

I’d like to begin with the following quotation from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics describing why humans need happiness: “Clearly there must be some such end since everything cannot be a means to something else since then there would be nothing for which we ultimately do anything, and everything would be pointless.” (*Note: Taken from a photocopied excerpt of Book 1 read in a former class – I could not find the translator or page number.) For Aristotle, “happiness” was more analogous to the idea of excellence, something achieved with intent, with purpose and habit – a lifelong way of living. The final four words from that quote always jump out at me – everything would be pointless if there were no happiness? Life, then, is inextricably bound to this idea of happiness, which explains the restlessness of our souls. But what happens if we never achieve this happiness? Is the mere journey towards it enough, or without the achievement, is life simply “pointless”?

There are some who argue that happiness is really an unachievable ideal, but zealously and tirelessly pursued anyway – this is the view of humanity that is illustrated in Joseph Conrad’s masterpiece, The Heart of Darkness. In the novel, the narrator Marlowe discovers knowledge about humanity that he would rather have kept locked away, far out of reach. In his exploration into the wild hearts of men, he discovers humanity to be, ultimately, hopelessly depraved. Without the societal constructs of law, religion, accountability, community, and guilt, men revert to their innate, bestial inclinations. It presents a very Hobbesian state of nature where life is merely nasty, brutish, and short. The “savages” are completely unalterable from their bestiality. However noble the attempts to convert, all attempts are futile. One line, in fact, from one “civilized” man to another, is that they need to “exterminate the brutes!” which is ironic when Marlowe later realizes that all are as equally brutish as the “savages” to whom he refers; there really is no “them” versus “us.” Though even with this being the true state, most people cannot handle the weight of such knowledge. Most people choose to live in the comfort of artificial light, either due to obliviousness or denial, and go on with their ultimately pointless lives.

Marlowe goes on the journey to see what knowledge he hopes Kurtz (discussed later on) can reveal to him, supernatural knowledge about the meaning of life that no one else can possess. It turns out to be very different knowledge than he expected. In the beginning of the journey, he catches glimpses of this unpleasant truth himself, but decides to submerge himself in mediocre tasks to keep his mind occupied elsewhere instead. (Compare this to why most humans fill their lives with innumerable meaningless tasks.) He ultimately discovers that there is no real light outside of the impenetrable darkness, only artificial, society-created light. Kurtz was the most devoutly religious, idealistic, moral, promising, etc. young man who became the most successful manager for the British ivory company; and he died as the most corrupt savage imaginable. If he can fall from the “light” to his natural, innate, brutish human character, no one is safe. As Kurtz lay dying, Marlowe realizes the purposeless that can become of a wasted life, and as he returns to London, he sees that the “civilized world” is filled with hypocrites who pretend not to know better, and are satisfied. This is especially embodied in the character of the Intended, Kurtz’s fiancé, who represents the bulk of humanity living in society. She is hopeful, incessantly and wishfully romantic, and completely naïve, yet somehow content. In the end Marlowe decides to lie to her about the true nature of Kurtz to keep her in this illusory, idyllic world, and keep her from knowing the truth; he decides it is better for society to carry on in their fictitious bustling lives. Only a few really come to grips with the truth – the nihilistic void in their hearts. Ought he have shared his knowledge of the true light that is, really, utter darkness, or was he right to keep the people content?

The life we live is the only one we are given, so obviously we want to make it the very best that we can. We all constantly strive to accomplish: we set plans, make goals, and see them through. There seems to be a constant unrest within our very core telling us to keep trying to improve, not to settle, not to grow too complacent. We want to be something more than what we are now, and to have more than we now have. We seem to be continually discontent. Our human condition drives this; we know our own finitude and knowledge of death can motivate us. We are incessantly driven towards “the better.” Maybe this is a little hubristic, our thinking we can really change things and that we are somehow perfectible. Yet no matter how many things we accumulate or tasks we accomplish, there seems to be some residual feeling of incompleteness, an enduring sense of emptiness, a longing for more, and the bitter sting of idividualistic isolationism. As Conrad writes, “We live as we dream – alone;” and again I’ll ask, when happiness seems unreachable, is life just “pointless”? Maybe all of this working, all the busyness with which we fill our lives is in an attempt to divert this sense of nihilism. If I keep working and attaining, all will not be for naught – I will matter.

7 comments:

Anonymous said...

If there is Reason to our lives, is it important for us to know it? Doesn't it seem that if the gods wanted us to fulfill Purpose that they would have made it known to us? Since all men die before ever knowing Purpose it must be something that is achieved regardless of the paths they travel. Hence we should not worry ourselves with Purpose, and let Experience be our reason to live.

Andrea Lowry said...

Anonymous,
I'm not sure that I see how your comment relates to what was written, unless you are equating 'Reason' and 'Purpose' with happiness, with that for which we live as an end in itself.
In any case, why do you say that "all men die before ever knowing Purpose"? Does this mean that there is something towards which we aim, something for which we live, but we die before knowing what it is? We will have to wait until we’re on our deathbeds, and even then not know if we knew our purpose? But then you say that we achieve it no matter what, just by living, by 'Experience.' I'm not sure that experience can really be the meaning of living - we live to create experiences? Don’t they happen anyway? So how can "Experience be our reason to live"? Are you saying that life is lived in whatever way it is lived, and that it’s just in the living, the experience, that we have purpose? Purpose then is just de facto no matter what we make of it or how we define it, and whether or not we aim for it. I'm not sure I understand your argument completely.

Zach Sherwin said...

Andrea,

Excellent post, as always; certainly helped by the fact that Heart of Darkness was one of my favorite books (although I would not have anticipated it to be one prior to my initial reading).

To see if I can restate Aristotle's argument:
1. If [everything were a means to something else], Then ([there would not be anything for which we ultimately do everything]
2. If [there would not be anything for which we ultimately do everything] Then [everything would be pointless])

I presume he would say that, [everything would be pointless] is necessarily false, so, it is necessarily not the case that [everything is a means to something else], so there must be an ultimate end, and the pursuit of an ultimate end must correlate in some manner to happiness.

If I understand correctly, you're posing the question-- regardless of whether there is an ultimate end or not, what if we cannot know it? Your question is epistemological, not ontological, but is deeply relevant to the teleology of the human existence.

As you explore in your last paragraph, the question of, "when happiness seems unreachable, is life just pointless" is difficult. Let's assume that life has a purpose, but for some reason we necessarily cannot know x. The fact that we are able to coherently understand this idea implies that one's purpose does not necessarily have to be known; therefore, one's purpose does not necessarily correlate with knowledge. So, if my purpose was to be edified, but I had no way of knowing whether or not I had achieved sufficient edification, I might nevertheless have fulfilled my purpose.

This is where, I suppose, faith comes in. I would argue that logic is necessarily circular or arbitrarily axiomatic at some level (take your pick which approach you decide upon), and that at some point a faith-based decision must be made. This decision might be grounded in rationality, but cannot be reached through the language of necessity. It might be the case that there is no deductively valid, mathematically formulaic method to determining purpose, and yet as humans we are capable of at least some degree of understanding due to our ability to surpass sheer deduction and arbitrary decision-making.

Sorry to ramble; once again, great post!

Andrea Lowry said...

Zach,
Thank you for clarifying!

What do you think about the following, is it valid and also, does it correctly represent Aristotle’s argument, at least 1-3? (I very well may be mistaken)
1. There must be something for which we live.

2. If there weren’t this something, everything would be pointless.

3. That for which we live is happiness.

4. So then, if one is perpetually restless, always trying to improve, and never satisfied (i.e., unhappy), he does not have that something for which he lives.

5. Everything is pointless for him.

And maybe, 6. All humans are perpetually restless, always trying to improve, and never satisfied (so unhappy); therefore everything is pointless for all humans.

This is the nihilistic view shown in Conrad’s novel, that, ultimately, humans are just never going to be happy, that by either the nature of happiness itself or by human nature we cannot achieve it, and so everything (and everyone) is pointless.

I believe this is incoherent on several levels, especially the absoluteness of the “all” humans and that happiness is unattainable, but an interesting view nonetheless. Seriously, can happiness really be that for which we do everything if it is truly unattainable? If we accept that happiness is why we do everything, then it would seem that it would necessarily be something real and possible. Although perhaps some would say that it happiness is the telos, it is the end goal, but only as some sort of pathway, as a means, and that the living in pursuit of the end is the end itself, like a journey to the pot of gold at the end of a rainbow where the pot doesn’t really exist.

But I digress; anyway, are 1-6 correct? What am I missing? Help me out here!

Zach Sherwin said...

Andrea,

Here's the points you mentioned:

1. There must be something for which we live.

2. If there weren’t this something, everything would be pointless.

3. That for which we live is happiness.

4. So then, if one is perpetually restless, always trying to improve, and never satisfied (i.e., unhappy), he does not have that something for which he lives.

5. Everything is pointless for him.

(Maybe) 6. All humans are perpetually restless, always trying to improve, and never satisfied (so unhappy); therefore everything is pointless for all humans.

We can talk about them in terms of whether they are correct and in terms of whether the argument is valid; let's assume that [6] is the conclusion.

First of all, I think that [2] is irrelevant. If I said,

1. A
2. If Not [A], Then [B]

Number [2.] would be irrelevant, because "Not A" will never occur (since that would contradict [1.]). Similarly,

1. [There must be something for which we live]

2. If Not [there is something for which we live], Then [Everything would be pointless]

However, what follows from the second half-- the "consequent"-- of [2] will never occur, because the affirmation of the first half-- the "antecedent"-- can never be true, that "Not [A]", because it would contradict [1].

I'm going to make some refinements, hopefully in the spirit of what you said, and add a time element to overcome a problem with the notion of "never":

1. [There must be something for which humans live.]

2. [That for which humans live is happiness.]

4. IF [one is in a state of perpetual restlessness and dissatisfaction at moment "x"], THEN [he does not have that something for which he lives at moment "x"].

Conclusion: Everything is pointless for him at moment "x".

I think that premise one and two are fine; they're simple premises. [4] seems tricky; by "never satisfied", do you imply a future projection? If truth means "coherence with the real world", can this every be "true"-- can someone ever truly exist without the possibility of future happiness? Thus, I added a time element. Suppose that, yesterday, Moriarty was in a state of restlessness and dissatisfaction due to his foul deeds. Everything would be pointless to him, correct?

There's a tension here, still. What do you mean by, "everything would be pointless to him"? Do you mean that he would perceive everything as being pointless (which might not be true; he might have false beliefs), there would not actually be an ontological purpose for him (which would contradict [1]), or that he would be unable to accurately perceive his purpose?

I'm not sure... I think you're really on to something interesting, but it might need-- and certainly merits-- more fleshing out.

DunceScotus said...

At the risk of being charged with incivility or arguing in bad faith--no, that's the other writer, isn't it?--let me just propose an alternative reading of Aristotle based on a different (and superior) translation.

Terence Irwin's translation of (1094a19ff) is "Suppose, then, that the things achievable by action have some end that we wish for because of itself, and because of which we wish for the other things, and that we do not choose everything because of something else—for if we do, it will go on without limit, so that desire will prove to be empty and futile. Clearly, this end will be the good, that is to say, the best good."

On this reading, Aristotle cannot be forced into what we can by now call "the Lowry Disjunction." The Lowry Disjunction is this: Either X or nihilism. Either Geocentrism or Nihilism. Either Happiness or Nihilism. (Either Freddie Mercury and Queen or Nihilism?) And so on.

But for Aristotle, nihilism is not in view. Instead, the argument is more like this:

1. If there is no ultimate end, no final end, then decision-making will be pretty darn difficult (for there will be no rational way to resolve a conflict between two or more desires).
2. There is an ultimate end, a highest or best good.
3. Therefore, decision-making can be rational.
4. Therefore, I can continue on with these bloody lectures.

This argument itself, is not terribly interesting except insofar as it does disclose the sort of assumption that perhaps one must make in order to get ethics/political science off the ground.

And, of course, it leaves you free to continue on with the Lowry disjunction in other areas!

Zach Sherwin said...

My apologies on behalf of that "other poster"; hopefully he can change his wily ways.

At any rate, the translation clarification changes the argument pretty significantly. Very interesting!